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I. 
STATE1\1ENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Title to ce1iain property that is the subject of this appeal was conveyed to The David and 
Marvel Benton Trust by David E. and Marvel C. Benton in 2003. On July 1, 2010, David and 
Marvel Benton personally executed a Quitclaim Deed purporting to transfer a portion of the property 
at issue in this case to their daughter, Dorothy B. McCaiiy. The property to be conveyed was only 
described by street address and reference to a building, parking lots and access. This is inadequate 
description invalidates the Quitclaim Deed. In November 2010, the David and Marvel Benton Trust 
was amended to prevent David and Marvel Benton from acting alone to convey prope1iy out of the 
Trust. By that trust instrument, which was recorded in the records of Bonneville County, FamilyCo-
Trustees had to sign with one or more of David and Marvel to effectively tra11sfer property from the 
Trust. The Quitclaim Deed was not notarized or recorded until 2012. \Vhen it was recorded in 2012, 
David Benton was advised by the Bonneville County recorder's office that the property description 
was inadequate and that because the property was held in trust, it could only be conveyed by the 
trustees of the trust. In an attempt to correct the problems which had made the July 1, 2010 
Quitclaim Deed ineffective to transfer the property to Dorothy McCarty, David and Marvel made 
changes to the 2010 Quitclaim Deed. A third pa1iy, Laurie Cromwell, inserted handwritten 
interlineations into the 2010 Quitclaim Deed. Those attempts to change the Quitclaim Deed in2012 
were also ineffective because the trustees authorized to act on behalf of the Trust in 2012 did not 
sign/approve the new documents which were filed in 2012. 
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The rest of the story is that by the time the July 1, 2010 Quitclaim Deed was first presented 
recording on April 24, 2012, and then modified and re-recorded on June 2012, the Bentons had 
failed mentally, were vulnerable and were in need of protection. David Benton was diagnosed with 
dementia on April 26, 2012 and on that same date Marvel Benton was detennined to be 
demonstrating mild to moderate impaim1ent in memory functioning and decreased functional 
abilities by a clinical neuropsychologist. On June 7, 2012, just a month after the modified Quitclaim 
Deed was recorded in an attempt to convey the Benton Engineering office building to Dorothy 
McCaiiy, a Seventh Judicial District Magistrate entered an order appointing a conservator for David 
E. and Marvel C. Benton to protect their assets. Although there was clear evidence of undue 
influence over David and Marvel at the time when they were vulnerable to exploitation it was not 
necessary for the district court to reach those issues because the original 2010 Quitclaim Deed and 
the corrected Quitclaim Deed were not effective to transfer title. 
The undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion - the property at issue in this lawsuit was 
never conveyed out of trust to Dorothy McCaiiy. However, the ineffective Quitclaim Deeds which 
have been recorded two times in the records of Bonneville County created a cloud on the title to the 
property which were declared by the district court, as a matter oflaw, to be without force or effect. 
Title was properly quieted in the name of the Trust free ai1d clear of any claim by Dorothy McCarty. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The district court entered a Memorandum Decision on Parties' Cross-Motions for Smm11ai-y 
Judgment on October 31, 2014. R. p. 591. The Decision first struck all statements from the affidavits 
filed in support of Dorothy McCarty that purport to describe the intent, capacity, or understanding 
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of David and Marvel Benton on the basis that such statements are not relevant. R. p. 594. The district 
comi detennined that statements regarding intent were not relevant to the Trust's arguments that the 
2010 Quitclaim Deed contained an invalid prope1iy description and the modified Quitclaim Deed 
violated the 2010 amended trust agreement. R. p. 594. Statements regarding intent would only be 
relevant if the district comi found the Quitclaim Deeds or the amended trust agreement to be 
ambiguous. R. p. 594-95. The district court then found the 2010 Quitclaim Deed was void because 
it did not provide an adequate legal description of the subject property. R. p. 596-600. The property 
desc1iption was ambiguous, but that ambiguity in the prope1iy description rendered the 2010 
Quitclaim Deed void as a matter of law. R. p. 599. The district court noted that McCarty agreed 
during oral argument that this was a pure question oflaw. R. p. 599, n. 22. 
The district comi then held that the 2010 amendment to the Trust unambiguously barred 
David and Marvel from being the only t\vo signors on behalf of the Trust. R. p. 601-03. Thus, after 
the Trust was amended in 2010, David and Marvel did not have authority to act on behalf of the 
Trust without at least one signature from a Family Co-Trustee. R. 603. The modified Quitclaim Deed 
with the attached mete and bounds description was invalid because it was authorized only by David 
and Marvel and did not include a signature from a Family Co-Trustee. R. p. 601-03. 
The Decision concluded by stating that the doctrines of reformation, interlineation and 
correction deed did not apply and could not overcome the inadequate legal desc1iption in the 2010 
Quitclaim Deed. R. p. 603-06. The district comi detennined that the doctrine ofrefonnation can only 
be applied to correct a scrivener's error or a mutual mistake of the parties. R. p. 603-04. But an 
inadequate property description is not subject to refonnation. R. p. 604-05. The theory of 
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interlineation did not apply because there is no authority to suggest a proper legal description can 
inserted into a deed through interlineation. p. 605. And there was no interlineation on the 2010 
Quitclaim Deed before the Trust was amended. Finally, a correction deed can only be used to refonn 
a deed that contains a mutual mistake or scrivener's error. R. p. 606. The "conection deed" in this 
case was improperly executed by David and Marvel without the signature of a Family Co-Trustee 
as required by the amended Trust. R. p. 606. 
A motion for reconsideration was then filed by McCaiiy. R. p. 610. In denying the motion, 
the district comi stated: 
On reconsideration, McCaliy has continued her same strategy used on summary 
judgment: to persuade the Couli through parol evidence offered by expeli witnesses 
that the legal description is sufficient. ... Just because an expert believes he or she can 
interpret the intent of a legal description does not necessarily mean it complies with 
the Statute of Frauds. McCaliy conceded at oral argument on smnmary judgment that 
whether a legal description complies with the Statute of Frauds is a question oflaw 
for the Couli to decide. She does not directly challenge that conclusion oflaw now 
by presenting any legal authority to the contrary. Yet, she still urges the Comi to 
disregai-d the Statute ofFrauds by consideringparol evidence from licensed surveyors 
who testify that they can discern what the grantor intended. 
R. p. 627-28. The district couli then observed that Idaho case law favored a literal reading of the 
property descriptions contained in deeds and held that the prope1iy description in the 2010 Quitclaim 
Deed violated the Statute of Frauds because it does not describe exactly what propeliy in tem1s of 
identity, quantity or boundaries was intended to be conveyed. R. p. 630. The district couli also noted 
that the survey conducted by on of McCaliy's expelis, Mr. Leavitt, contained a "reconciled 
boundary" that could not have originated from the description in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed because 
Leavitt admitted to relying on the deeds of neighboring parcels and the "reconciled boundary" 
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desc1iption contains odd shaped boundary lines that are not referenced in the original property 
description. R. p. 630-31. 
The district court reaffinned its original ruling that the modified Quitclaim Deed with the 
interlineations and attached metes and bounds prope1iy description did not comply with the 
amendment to the Trust that occurred in November 2010, nearly a year and a half before the 
Quitclaim Deed was modified and then notarized. R. p. 632-34. McCmiy' s argument that David and 
Marvel did not need to sign the Quitclaim Deeds as "Trustees" was not relevant to the ruling that the 
2010 Quitclaim Deed was invalid due to an inadequate property description. The district comi 
concluded by finding the amendment to the trust was unambiguous in its requirement that any 
transaction involving Trust prope1iy could not be effectuated solely by David and Marvel, but vwuld 
required the signature of at least one Family Co-Trustee. R. p. 633-34. The modified Quitclaim Deed 
that was notarized in 2012 did not include a signature from Family Co-Trustee. R. p. 633-634. A 
judgment with a Rule 54(b) certificate attached was then filed. R. p. 636-37. McCmiy appealed. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The David and Marvel Benton Trust was created by David E. (Eugene) Benton and Marvel 
C. (Cooley) Benton on April 23, 1990. An Affidavit of Trust dated April 23, 1990, was executed 
by David E. (Eugene) Benton and Marvel C. (Cooley) Benton confinningthe existence of the Trust 
and their appointment as the initial Trustees. The Trust was created in Bonneville County and at the 
time of its creation David E. (Eugene) Benton and Marvel C. (Cooley) Benton were residents of 
Bonneville County, Idaho. R. p. 155-72. 
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On February 14, 2003, the following described property was transfened to The David and 
Benton Trust by Conected W ananty Deed, a true and correct copy of which is attached to 
Complaint filed in this matter as Exhibit "B" and \Vhich was recorded with the Bo1meville 
County Recorder on June 4, 2003 as instrument number 1116070: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Linden Park Addition, Division No. 1, to the 
City of Idaho Falls, Idaho and running thence S89°30'30"E 120.52 feet; thence 
S65°52'00"E 103.50 feet; thence S59°34'00"E 162.95 feet to the West line of Linden 
Drive, a 60 foot wide street, point also being on a curve having a radius of 1096. 7 4 
feet and a chord that bears S3 7°10'54" W 194. 72 feet; thence to the right along said 
curve 194.98 feet through a central angle of 10°11 'l O"; thence S42°16'30"W 125.00 
feet to a point of curve having a radius of 604.49 feet and a chord that bears 
S30°47'20"W 240.75 feet; thence to the left along said curve 242.37 feet through a 
central angle of 22°58'22" to a point of reverse curve having a radius of 20.00 feet 
and a chord that bears S54°46'49"\V 23.22 feet; thence to the right along said curve 
24.77 feet through a central angleof70°57'2 l "; thence N89°44'30"W 14.18 feet along 
the North side of Seventh Street; thence N00°l 5'30"E 593.67 feet along the West line 
of Block "A" to the point of beginning. 
R. p. 25. 
On June 30, 2008, David Benton executed a First Codicil to his Will, which in part 
contained the following statement: 
I hereby state that DOROTHY BENTON MCCARTY does not own any part of the 
Benton Engineering Office located at 550 Linden Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho, nor any 
of the garages or smTounding property. I further declare that DOROTHY BENTON 
MCCARTY does not own any part of the Benton Engineering business. I 
specifically direct that upon my death that she will not become the manager of 
Benton Engineering. I further direct that in the event of my disability or incapacity 
that she shall not become the manager of Benton Engineering. 
R. p. 142. 
On July 1, 2010, David E. Benton and Marvel C. Benton signed a Quitclaim Deed which 
purported to convey the following described property to Dorothy B. McCarty: 
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The property at 550 Linden Drive and the building known as Benton Engineering 
building located upon the property and all adjacent parking lots to the South of the 
Building and to the West of the Building and right of access into the parking lot 
located at 550 Linden Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho located in Bonneville County and 
more commonly known as the Benton Engineering Office Building. 
R.p. 27. 
On the same day, July 1, 2010, David and Marvel Benton also signed a Warranty Deed which 
purpmied to convey the following described property to Dorothy B. McCarty: 
The Benton Engineering Office building and parking lots adjacent to the sidewalk of 
the building located at 550 Linden Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho in the county of 
Bom1eville. 
This prope1iy being separated from the balance of the adjacent lots and garages 
owned by David E. Benton and Marvel C. Benton located near the building identified 
as Benton Engineering Office Building and parking lots adjacent to the sidewalk of 
the building located at 550 Linden Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho in the county of 
Bonneville. 
R. p. 430. There is no explanation in the record why David and Marvel would sign two different 
deeds on the same day for what appears to include some of the same property but with different 
descriptions of the property. Furthennore, there is no evidence that anyone has ever attempted to 
record the warranty deed. 
On November 1, 2010, a Second and Irrevocable Amendment to The David and Marvel 
Benton Trust was executed by David E. Benton and Marvel C. Benton. R. p. 72-80. The amendment 
provided, in relevant part, that for the remainder of the lives of David Eugene Benton and Marvel 
Cooley Benton that: 
... not less than two signatures shall be required on all transactions of any kind or 
nature involving the [David and Marvel Benton Trust] and all of its property and 
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assets. Subject to the disability of Grantors [David Eugene Benton and Marvel 
Cooley Benton], such two signatures may be made by one Family Co-Trustee and 
one Grantor, or by two Family co-Trustees. In no event shall Grantors be the only 
two signors on behalf of the Trust. 
R. p. 76-77. The Second and Irrevocable Amendment to the David and Marvel Benton Trust also 
contained a provision which stated: "In no event at any time shall Dorothy Benton McCaiiy serve 
as a Trustee of the Trust or have control over any prope1iy or business entity owned by the Trust." 
R. p. 77. 
David and Marvel Benton each executed a new Last \Vill and Testament on November 27, 
2010. R. p. 450-92. Their respective wills each contain the same paragraph 5.1 which reads: 
I hereby state that DOROTHY BENTON McCARTY does not own any paii of the 
Benton Engineering Office located at 550 Linden Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho, nor any 
of the garages or smTounding prope1iy. I further declare that DOROTHY BENTON 
McCARTY does not own anypaii of the Benton Engineering Business. I specifically 
direct that [i]n the event of my disability or incapacity that she shall not become the 
manager of Benton Engineering. 
R.p.454,469,486. 
An Affidavit of Trustees for the David and Marvel Benton Trust was executed on August 1, 
2011, which gave notice of the requirement that all transactions regarding the trust property be made 
either by one Family Co-Trustee and one Grantor, or by two Family co-Trustees, but in no event 
shall Grantors be the only two signors on behalf of the Trust. R. p. 152-54. To give notice of this 
requirement to the public, the Affidavit was recorded as instrument number 13 97 516 on August 23, 
2011 in the records of Bonneville County, Idaho. R. p. 144-54. 
The Quitclaim Deed which bears a date ofJuly 1, 2010, was not actually notarized until April 
24, 2012, and was not recorded until April 24, 2012 as Instrument #1415154 in the records of 
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Bonneville County, Idaho. R. p. 27-28. 
Atthetimethe 2010 Quitclaim Deed was recorded on April 24, 2012, DorothyMcCa1iywas 
advised by the recorder's office for Bonneville County, Idaho that the Quitclaim Deed was defective 
because the prope1iy description was deficient and further that because the property was in trnst it 
was necessary for the trnstees of the trust to convey the property. R. p. 407-408, 436. 
On April 26, 2012, David Benton and Marvel Benton were examined by Antonietta A. 
Russo, Ph.D. at the NeuroSpecialty Clinic at TOSH in Murray, Utah. R. p. 87-105. She opined that 
David Benton was suffering from "dementia" and she was concerned that David Benton was "a 
vulnerable adult in need of protection with respect to his basic living needs and finances." She 
rec01m11ended a limited guardianship and conservatorship for David Benton. R. p. 102-103 .1 She 
opined that Marvel Benton was "demonstrating mild to moderate impainnent in memory functioning 
and decreased functional abilities" which "likely represent an insidious process linked to her overall 
medical/neurological functioning." R. p. 91. She recommended a limited guardianship and 
conservatorship for Marvel Benton because she was "at risk for exploitation."R. p. 91. 
On or about May 4, 2012 Laurie Cromwell modified the Quitclaim Deed by adding the word 
"Trnst" behind "David E. Benton and Marvel C. Benton" and by also adding the words 'Exhibit "A"' 
and attaching a document identified as Exhibit "A" which contained a metes and bounds description. 
R. p. 408-09. The modified Quitclaim Deed was then notaiized twice by Beth Maiiin on May 4, 
1 When the Clerk's record was prepared, a page in the medical records that were attached to the affidavit of 
Gary Cooper was inadvertently left out. That page should have been located between pages 102 and 103 of the 
Clerk's record. The missing page is page 6 of9 in the medical record. The missing document was e-mailed to the 
parties and the Court on March 8, 2016 by Amanda Birch. This citation :includes that missing page. 
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2 and recorded as Instrument #1416139 in the records of Bonneville County on May 4, 2012. R. 
8; 409. 
On June 2012, Magistrate Steven A. Gardner signed an Amended Order Appointing 
Conservator for David and Marvel Benton because they "have property which could be wasted or 
dissipated unless proper management is provided." 111e A.mended Order specifically instructed the 
Conservator to recognize and acknowledge the "existence of The David and Marvel Benton Trust 
with all amendments thereto" which held financial assets in trust for the benefit of David and Marvel 
Benton. R. p. 107-110. 
In suppmi of a motion to reconsider the district comi' s Memorandum Decision on summary 
judgment, Dorothy McCaiiy submitted the Second Supplemental Affidavit ofKim Leavitt. R. p. 615. 
Attached to that affidavit was a survey of the subject property that was perfom1ed and recorded by 
Kim Leavitt. R. p. 615-617. The survey was admitted as evidence and is identified as "Exhibit A 
Recorder's Certificate Boundary Descriptions" in the Clerk's Ceiiification of Exhibits. Leavitt 
surveyed the property using the original property description from the 2010 Quitclaim Deed to 
"prove the sufficiency" of that desc1iption. R. p. 619. However, the survey contains a metes and 
bounds description referred to as the "Benton Engineering Building Reconciled Boundary." That 
metes and bounds description is different from the metes and bounds description that was attached 
to the modified Quitclaim Deed. R. p. 34-35; Exhibit A Recorder's Certificate Boundary 
Descriptions. As well, the Leavitt survey asserted that there is 0.54 acres in the parcel he surveyed. 
Exhibit A Recorder's Certificate Boundary Descriptions. However, the metes and bounds description 
attached to the modified Quitclaim Deed only purports to contain 0.375 acres. R. p. 35. The two 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - PAGE 10 
separate metes and bounds descliptions based on the same incomplete legal desc1iption in the 2010 
Quitclaim Deed are different and describe different amounts of prope1ty. R. p. 34-35; Exhibit 
Recorder's Ce1tificate Boundary Descriptions. The discrepancy is not surprising as McCaiiy has 
consistently claimed the 2010 Quitclaim Deed conveyed more prope1iy than is desc1ibed in the metes 
and bounds description that was attached to the modified Quitclaim Deed in 2012. R. 496-501. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
There are only three issues properly presented and ripe for appeal. 
1. Whether the district comi properly detennined as a matter of law that the property 
description in the July 1, 2010 Quitclaim Deed was unenforceable because the property 
description did not sufficiently describe exact property to be conveyed? 
2. Whether the district comi conectly detennined that the modifications and notarizations of 
the Quitclaim Deed violated the amended Trust agreement that prohibited David and Marvel 
from being the sole signatolies for any transaction regarding trust prope1iy? 
3. Whether the doctrines of refonnation, interlineation, and correction deed did not apply 
because such doctrines caimot be used to circumvent the Statute of Frauds by substituting 
a new property descliption into a deed to make the deed enforceable? 
The issues on appeal identified by McCarty are either subsumed into the three issues 
identified above, are not relevant to the detenninative issues, or are being raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
III. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Trust requests that attorney fees be awarded on appeal based on Idaho Code sections 12-
121, 12-123 and Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that McCaliy 
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has pursued this appeal unreasonably and without foundation in law or fact. McCarty has raised 
"'""-U"''"'"' that were not presented to the district court, taken positions are inconsistent with 
representations made to the district court, and ignored the controlling case cited extensively by 
the district court in an attempt to circumvent the Statute of Frauds. 
IV. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIE,v OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION 
McCaiiy has stated the appropriate standard of review for appeals from a decision on a 
motion for sununaryjudgment. The appellate court applies the saine standard of review as the district 
corni, which is the summary judgment standard. 
B. STANDARD OF REVIE,V REGARDING A PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
CONTAINED IN A DEED 
McCarty cites a standard of review that is inconsistent with the position taken before the 
district comi and that is not applicable to property descriptions in a deed. The district court included 
a footnote in the Memorandum Decision stating: 
At oral argument, the parties agreed that whether a property description is sufficient 
is a legal question for the Comi's detennination. The Court could not find Idaho 
authority directly in support of this; however, general contract principles indicate that 
this is the case. "Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but 
interpreting an ambiguous tennis an issue of fact." Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch 
Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,633,226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). However, if a 
description in a contract transferring real estate is ambiguous on its face, it is 
insufficient to transfer property. White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1, 3, 644 P.2d 323, 325 
(1982). Thus, because an ambiguous description caimot be submitted to a fact-finder 
for resolution, the question of whether a property description is sufficient must be a 
legal question for the Court. 
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p. 599, n. 22. McCarty did not contest this issue before the district court during summary 
judgment briefing and oral argument or during the briefing and oral argument on the motion to 
reconsider. Instead, McCarty argued that summary judgment should be granted in her favor and not 
that there were questions of fact that should go to a jury. R. p. 57-69, 200-267, 610-613. 
In White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1,644 P.2d 323 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court refused to 
apply the typical contract standard to a property description. The Court stated: 
The description of the land as stated in the earnest money receipt is "all land west of 
road running south to the Rehn fannstead containing 960 acres Exact acreage to be 
detennined by survey. Price to be adjusted up or down at the rate of$243.00 per acre 
Cassia County, State of Idaho." There is nothing in the description with which to 
pinpoint exactly which 960 acres was to be transferred. As such, this description is 
ambiguous on its face and will not supp01i an award for specific perfonnance or 
damages. Appellant invites us to apply the standard here which we apply to 
other ambiguous contracts and allow extrinsic or parol evidence to clarify the 
terms of the written agreement. \Ve decline to do so. Although this court has never 
adopted a highly defined standard for dete1111ining the sufficiency of a description 
ofland we have adopted a general standard which was set forth in Allen v. Kitchen, 
16Idaho 133,142, lOOP.1052, 1061 (1909),quotingCraigv.Zelian, 137Cal.105, 
69 P. 853 (1902). 
"An agreement for the sale of real property must not only be in 
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, but the writing 
must also contain such a description of the property agreed to be 
sold, either in terms or by reference, that it can be ascertained 
without resort to parol evidence. Parol evidence may be resorted to 
for the purpose of identifying the description contained in the writing, 
with its location upon the ground, but not for the purpose of 
asce1iaining and locating the land about which the particular parties 
negotiated, and supplying a description thereof which may have been 
omitted from the writing." 
See also, Luke v. Conrad and Matheson v. Harris, both supra. The description 
involved here is so inadequate that to allow parol evidence and the surrounding 
circumstances to be considered would be to supply a description of the property 
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which was omitted from the w1iting in order to asce1iain and locate the land about 
which the parties negotiated. As such, the earnest money receipt is unenforceable. 
103 Idaho at 3, 644 P .2d at ( emphasis added). 
McCaiiy attempts to create ambiguity by failing to distinguish between the standards that 
apply to the review of a deed as a whole and the standard that applies to the sufficiency of the 
prope1iy description in the deed. McCarty relies on Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 
154 Idaho 6, 8, 293 P.3d 630, 632 (2012) for the proposition that the distiict court erred in 
detennining as a matter oflaw that the 2010 Quitclaim Deed was unenforceable because the property 
desc1iption was ambiguous. Ida-Therm does state that if a deed is found to be ainbiguous then its 
interpretation is a question of fact. That ignores the fact that the Cami in Ida-Therm was not 
addressing the property desc1iption contained in a deed but a mineral reservation tenn in a deed. Id. 
Thus, the typical contract standard applied and not the standard that applies exclusively to property 
descriptions as stated in FVhite. 
Contrary to McCarty's argument in her "Standard of Review" section, the district comi did 
not err in disregarding the parol evidence offered by McCarty. Instead, the district court was adhering 
to the standard established in FVhite that explicitly prohibits detennining what property is being 
conveyed by resorting to parol evidence. White, I 03 Idaho at 3, 644 P.2d at 325. There is no good-
faith argument for why McCarty ignores the property description standard from WJ1ite, and applied 
by the dist1ict court, in representing that this case presents a question of fact instead of a pure 
question oflaw. 
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V. 
AERIAL VIE\V OF PROPERTY IN DISPUTE 
The image, included in Appendix 1 attached hereto, is an aerial view of the property in 
dispute. This image was not presented to the district court but it corresponds with the exhibit marked 
in the Clerk's Certification of Exhibits as "Defendant's Exhibit A Map." This image is being used 
for illustrative purposes as the copy of Defendant's Exhibit A Map is too dark and obscures the 
details when copied. The Benton Engineering building is highlighted in purple. The disputed and 
approximate boundaries of the property that McCaiiy claims was conveyed to her by the 2010 
Quitclaim Deed is highlighted in yellow. The same features are highlighted in the same colors in 
Defendant's Exhibit A Map. 
VI. 
ARGUlVIENT 
A. THE JULY 1, 2010 QUITCLAIM DEED \VAS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT 
CONTAINED AN INADEQUATE PROPERTY DESCRIPTION. 
The property description in the July 1, 2010 Quitclaim Deed is insufficient to convey title. 
Idaho Code§ 9-503 requires transfers ofreal property to be in writing. The writing must also contain 
an adequate description of the prope1iy. In Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036 
(2003), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
An agreement for the sale of real property must not only be in writing and subscribed 
by the party to be charged, but the writing must also contain such a description of 
the property agreed to be sold, either in terms or by reference, that it can be 
ascertained without resort to parol evidence. Parol evidence may be resorted to for 
the purpose of identifying the description contained in the writing, with its location 
upon the ground, but not for the purpose of ascertaining and locating the land 
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about which the particular parties negotiated, and supplying a description 
thereof ,vhich may have been omitted ,,Titing. 
added). 
In Vvhite v. Rehn, 103 Idaho at 3, 644 P.2d at 325 the Idaho Supreme Comi explained the 
kind of description which must be contained in the agreement: "[t]he description involved here is 
so inadequate that to allow parol evidence and the surrounding circumstances to be considered would 
be to supply a description of the prope1iy which was omitted from the writing in order to asce1tain 
and locate the land about which the paiiies negotiated." 
The description of the land as stated in the earnest money receipt is "all land west of 
road running south to the Rehn fannstead containing 960 acres Exact acreage to be 
detern1ined by survey. Price to be adjusted up or down at the rate of$243.00 per acre 
Cassia County, State of Idaho." There is nothing in the description with which to 
pinpoint exactly which 960 acres was to be transferred. As such, this desc1iption is 
ambiguous on its face and will not support an award for specific perforn1ance or 
damages. Appellant invites us to apply the standard here which we apply to 
other ambiguous contracts and allow extrinsic or parol evidence to clarify the 
terms of the written agreement. ,v e decline to do so. Although this comt has never 
adopted a highly defined standard for detennining the sufficiency of a description of 
land we have adopted a general standard which was set fo1th in Allen v. Kitchen, 16 
Idaho 133, 142, 100 P. 1052, 1061 (1909), quoting Craigv. Zelian, 137 Cal. 105, 69 
P. 853 (1902). 
Id. ( emphasis added). The Court then went on to cite the standard that was cited above in Garner that 
the property description must be sufficiently detailed that it can be ascertained without resorting to 
parol evidence. This completely contradicts McCarty's assertion that "parol evidence is admissible" 
and the "Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that this includes evidence relating to any alleged 
ambiguity in the legal desc1iption." McCarty Brief, p. 24. McCarty has, without valid explanation, 
ignored long-standing precedent in Idaho in pursuing this appeal. 
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The Idaho Supreme Comi has been clear that in Idaho "we have required that a property 
designate "exactly" what prope1iy the seller is conveying to the buyer." Ray v. 
Idaho 625, 200 P .3d 117 4, 1179 (2009) A street address is insufficient to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds. Id. One year after Ray was decided, the Idaho Bankruptcy Court follmved Ray in a decision 
involving an invalid prope1iy description. The Bankruptcy Comi summarized Idaho law on the 
sufficiency of prope1iy descriptions: 
While the Idaho statutes do not specifically require a description of real prope1iy in 
the instrument of conveyance, Idaho courts have always required a description of the 
prope1iy or a reference to extrinsic evidence which describes the property being 
conveyed in order to satisfy the statute of frauds. In Ray, the Idaho Supreme Comi 
stressed that such a property description must "adequately describe the property so 
that it is possible for someone to identify 'exactly' what property the seller is 
conveying to the buyer." 200 P.3d at 1178 (citing Gamerv. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 
80 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2003)). It reiterated that" '[a] description contained in a deed 
will be sufficient so long as quantity, identity or boundaries of property can be 
detem1ined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to 
which it refers.'" Id. (quoting Garner, 80 P.3d at 1036). The Idaho Supreme Comi 
concluded that a prope1iy description in a real estate sales contract that consisted 
solely of a physical address did not satisfy the statute of frauds. 200 P .3d at 1177. 
Such a description, although providing the general location of the prope1iy, does not 
give the required exact "quantity, identity or boundaries of the real property." Id. at 
1179. 
In re Paul Edgar Mcmurdie And Shanell A1arie Mcmurdie, 448 B.R. 826 (Bankr.Idaho, 2010). 
Applied to the facts of this case the description contained in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed was, 
as a practical matter, nothing more than a physical address. The original property description states: 
The property at 550 Linden Drive and the building known as Benton Engineering 
building located upon the property and all adjacent parking lots to the South of the 
Building and to the West of the Building and right of access into the parking lot 
located at 550 Linden Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho located in Bonneville County and 
more commonly known as the Benton Engineering Office Building. 
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p. 27. McCarty argues that the description contains more than just an address because it references 
lots and 1ight of access. She relies on City of Kellogg v. Afission Af ountain Interests, Co., 
1 Idaho 239, 16 P.3d 915 (2000) for the proposition that this description is legally sufficient. A 
property description was upheld as valid in Kellogg because it only conveyed the property 
immediately under the identified ski lodge and there was a map attached to the deed. Lexington 
Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 284, 92 P.3d 526, 534 (2004) (stating that the 
property description in Kellogg was sufficient because the "quantity of the land involved was only 
the amount directly underneath the lodge, and not some other, larger parcel..." and a map that 
identified the specific property to be conveyed was attached to the agreement). In this case, McCaiiy 
claims more property than what is immediately under the Benton Engineering Building and the 
adjacent parking lots. Exhibit A Recorder's Certificate Boundary Descriptions. As well, there is no 
map attached to the 2010 Quitclaim Deed as there was to the agreement at issue in Kellogg. 
The original prope1iy description in this case purpmis to convey the property at the physical 
address AND the Benton Engineering Building AND all adjacent parking lots AND a right of access. 
The 2010 Quitclaim Deed does not limit the conveyance to the land directly underneath the building 
or the parking lots but purports to convey the curtilage and areas other than the building and parking 
lots. Thus, Kellogg does not apply and the description in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed is legally deficient 
and incapable of transferring property because a "property description that does not allow the court 
to pinpoint exactly what acreage is to be transferred is inadequate." Bauchman-Kingston P's hip, LP 
v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 91,233 P.3d 18, 22 (2008). The quantity, identity and boundaries cannot 
be identified from the face of the 2010 Quitclaim Deed. Therefore, the deed is invalid. Ray, 146 
Idaho at 630, 200 P.3d at 1179. 
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McCarty attempts to cure this deficiency by providing affidavits from various surveyors that 
testify that the description in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed is adequate. These affidavits are not 
admissible because the detennination of the legal sufficiency of the prope1iy description is a question 
of law to be decided from the face of the document by the court. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho at 91,233 
P.3d at 22. Even if the parol evidence is allowed, the surveyors opine that the Benton Engineering 
building and the parking lots serve as monuments and that this somehow cures any deficiency. 
Monuments must be a tangible landmarks that are physically stable, pennanent, and have a definite 
location. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 119, 794 P .2d 
1389, 1392 (1990). The building and parking lots are not pennanent. They could each be destroyed 
at any given moment on the whim of a prope1iy owner that would leave no trace for future reference. 
Use of these structures as monuments contradicts the holding in Lexington, where the Comi 
detennined that references to an existing residence, tennis court, swi1mning pool, and volley ball 
court was not sufficient to identify the property in question and the agreement transferring property 
was held invalid. Lexington, 140 Idaho 27 6, 92 P .3d 526. The property description was inadequate 
to properly identify the property in question and cannot be cured through affidavits. 
\Vhen Kim Leavittt, one of the surveyors that signed an affidavit, conducted a survey of the 
property based on the description in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed, the survey was inconsistent with the 
metes and bounds description that was attached to the modified Quitclaim Deed in 2012. R. p. 615-
617; Exhibit A Recorder's Certificate Boundary Descriptions. R. p. 34-35. The Leavitt survey 
asse1ied that there is 0.54 acres in the parcel he surveyed. Exhibit A Recorder's Certificate Boundary 
Descriptions. The metes and bounds description attached to the modified Quitclaim Deed only 
purpmis to contain 0.375 acres. R. p. 35. The two separate metes and bounds descriptions based on 
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the same incomplete legal description in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed are different and describe different 
amounts of property. R. p. 34-3 5; Exhibit A Recorder's Certificate Boundary Descriptions. Contrary 
to what McCarty argues, reso1iing to parol evidence only further obscures the identity, quantity, and 
borders of the property. 
There is no way to detennine the amount of property being conveyed or the boundaries from 
the description in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed. As the district comi noted in the Memorandum 
Decision: 
Most significantly, it is unclear whether "the prope1iy at 550 Linden Drive" does or 
does not include the curtilage ( or grass area) surrounding the building as well as the 
strip of grass separating the west parking lot from the property nmih of the Property. 
Because these po1iions are not referenced in the Quitclaim Deed, it is facially 
ambiguous. As fmiher evidence of this ambiguity, the long grass strip extending 
along the west paved parking area is not positioned next to the building and could 
logically be excluded because it might reasonably be considered part of the 
neighboring lot. Yet, McCarty, at oral argument, claimed that this strip of grass was 
included in the description of the Quitclaim Deed. Moreover, the description 
provides for a "right of access into the parking lot," but a map submitted at oral 
argument shows that the parking lot touches a public road, so it is unclear what 
purpose this apparent easement might serve. 
R. p. 599. The district court also noted that the description in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed does not 
mention "any curved roads, fences, curbs, borders, or meander lines serving as boundaries." R. p. 
630-31. However, the survey prepared by Kim Leavitt contains irregular boundary features that are 
not supported by the description in the Quitclaim Deed. R. 631. Leavitt had to rely on deeds for 
neighboring parcels in order to detennine what the boundaries were for the property that the 2010 
Quitclaim Deed supposedly conveyed to McCarty. R. 630-31. Even though it is improper parol 
evidence, the testimony of the surveyors only supports the district courts conclusion that the 
description is ambiguous. 
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McCarty's arguments regarding signing, delivery, notarization, recording, and whether David 
Marvel signed as "Trustees" are not relevant to the district court's detennination that the 2010 
Quitclaim Deed was unenforceable because the property description was insufficient. It should be 
noted however, that David and Marvel had previously conveyed the prope1ty that is in disputes in 
this case to the Trust with a proper legal description and in their capacities as Trustees. R. p. 25; R. 
p. 599, 11. 23. 
For the first time on appeal, McCaity argues that Idaho Code section 55-606 bars the Trust 
from challenging the Deeds at issue in this case. This issue was never presented to the district court. 
Substantive issues will not be considered that are raised for the first time on appeal. Barmore v. 
Perrone, 145 Idaho 340,343, 179 P.3d 303,306 (2008). However, Idaho Code section 55-606 is not 
applicable in this case. The statute in question is a recording statute that prevents a grantor from 
challenging a "grant or conveyance" based on when the document transferring title is recorded. I.C. 
§ 55-606. However, the Statute of Frauds in this case requires a finding that the 2010 Quitclaim 
Deed is unenforceable because of the insufficient property description. T:Vhite, 103 Idaho at 3,644 
P.2d at 325. The requirements for the conveyance in 55-606 is defined by section 55-601. The 
Supreme Comt has stated that the conveyance defined by 55-601 "must contain a sufficient 
description of the real property." Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai Cty., 98 Idaho 925, 928, 576 
P.2d 206,209 (1978). Thus, there was no grant or conveyance as is required before section 55-606 
becomes applicable. To hold otherwise would invalidate the Statute of Frauds and actually encourage 
fraudulent conduct in the transfer of real property. Again, a simple review of the case law governing 
these statutes would have revealed to McCarty that there was no basis in the law for her claim that 
Idaho Code section 55-606 completely barred the Trust from even bringing the quiet title action. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - PAGE 21 
THE APRIL 24, 2012 MODIFICATIONS TO THE QUITCLAIM DEED FAIL 
BECAUSE THE GRANTORS DID NOT HA VE THE PO\VER TO CONVEY THE 
PROPERTY AFTER THE TRUST AGREEMENT \VAS AMENDED IN NOVEMBER 
2010 
It is not clear why two (2) years after the Quitclaim Deed was supposedly signed that David 
E. and Marvel C. Benton decided to have the July 1, 2010 Quitclaim notarized. On July 24, 2012, 
Beth Martin notarized their acknowledgment that they had signed the Quitclaim Deed on July 1, 
2010. R. p. 27-28, 407. However, the notarized acknowledgment did not cure the problem with the 
defective prope1iy desciiption, a fact which was made known to David E. Benton when he recorded 
the instrument notarized by Beth Martin on April 24, 2012. R. p. 407-08, 436. The other problem 
brought to the attention of David E. Benton was that the prope1iy was not owned by him and his wife 
because they had transfe1Ted it into trust in 2003, which necessitated that it be conveyed by the 
Trustees of the Trust, not by him and his wife individually. R. p. 25, 407-08, 436. To cure these 
problems Michael Lund and Laurie Cromwell added a prope1iy description to the Quitclaim Deed 
and modified the Quitclaim Deed to show that it was conveyed by the Trust. R. p. 408-09, 593. The 
word "Trust" was inserted after David and Marvel's names in the Quitclaim Deed. R. p. 593. A new 
acknowledgment fonn was created and included as a new page to the modified Quitclaim Deed. R. 
p. 34-38. The new page contained the acknowledged signatures of David and Marvel to the modified 
Quitclaim Deed which now included a property description and also contained language to establish 
that the Bentons were not only signing as Trustees on May 4, 2012, but also that they had signed as 
Trustees on July 1, 2010. R. p. 34-38. 
The Acknowledgments signed on Apiil 24, 2012 and May 4, 2012 are inconsistent. The one 
executed on April 24, 2012 was executed in the individual form (David and Marvel as individuals) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - PAGE 22 
and the one on May 4, 2012 was executed in a representative capacity fonn (David and Marvel as 
Trustees). R. 36-38. There is no affidavit from Beth Martin to explain this discrepancy, it can 
even be explained. 
The real problem which was ignored by everyone involved in modifying, acknowledging and 
notarizing the July 1, 2010 Quitclaim Deed in 2012, is that The David and Marvel Benton were not 
agents of The David and Marvel Benton Trust authmized in writing to act on behalf of the Trust 
without at least the signature of a Family Co-Trustee. The David and Marvel Benton Trust had been 
irrevocably amended on November 1,2010, and an Affidavit of Trustees was recorded in Bonneville 
County on August 23, 2011 as Instrument#l397516-all before the acts in 2012 on which Dorothy 
B. McCaiiy relies to suppmi her claim that the Benton Enginee1ing prope1iy was conveyed to her 
by her parents. R. p. 144-54. The Second and Irrevocable Affidavit of Trustees gave notice to the 
public of the following provision in the Amended Trust: 
For the remainder of Grantors' lives, not less than two signatures shall be required 
on all transactions of any kind or nature involving the Trust and all of its prope1iy and 
assets. Subject to the disability of Granto rs, such two signatures may be made by one 
Family Co-Trustee and one Gran tor, or by two Family co-Trustees. In no event shall 
Grantors be the only two signors on behalf of the Trust. 
R. p. 147-54. 
There can be no question that the modifications of the July 1,2010 Quitclaim Deed on April 
24, 2012 and May 4, 2012, amounted to a "transaction" of some "kind or nature involving the Trust 
and all ofits property and assets." David E. Benton and Marvel C. Benton did not have the authority 
to "be the only two signors on behalf of the Trust" when they executed "on behalf of the Trust" the 
amendments and modifications constructed by Michael Lund, Laurie Cromwell and Beth Martin. 
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The Ben tons were not "authorized representatives" of the Trust, something which was ignored and 
not reflected in the acknowledgment. See I. C. §55-707 A. 
Trustees of a Trust have only the powers confened by the Trust instrument. The Trust 
instrument can also limit the powers of the Trustee. I. C. §§ 68-105, 106. In this case, the Bentons 
had only limited powers after November 1,2010, and they did not have the sole authority to execute 
the modified Quitclaim Deed on April 24, 2012 and May 4, 2012 without a co-signature by one of 
the Family Co-Trustees. After November 1, 2010, David E. and Marvel Benton were no longer the 
exclusive agents of the Trust "authorized in writing" to convey title to the property. The Statute of 
Frauds (I. C. §9-503) requires the authority to act as an agent of another (the Trust in this case) to 
be in writing and the only authoiity which was in writing after November 1, 2010, identified the 
authorized representatives or agents as "one Family Co-Trustee and one Grantor, or two Family co-
Trustees."The written authorization specifically stated, "In no event shall Grantors be the only tv,'o 
signors on behalf of the Trust." Clearly David E. and Marvel Benton did not have authority on 
behalf of the Trust to convey this property out of Trust and into the name of Dorothy B. McCaiiy in 
2012 by signing the notarized acknowledgments. Without authority in writing, the modified 
Quitclaim Deeds which were signed and acknowledged on April 24, 2012 and May 4, 2012 did not 
convey title to Dorothy B. McCarty. 
McCarty argues that the deficiencies in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed that were identified by 
Bonneville County were unnecessary and the result of bias. This is not gennane to the decision by 
the district court or the issues on appeal regarding the validity of the original prope1iy description. 
However, the Bonneville County Assessor did submit an affidavit that included an explanations of 
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his and his employee's interactions with McCarty. R. p. 496-500. The County could not properly 
identify the property from the description contained in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed that only had 
reference to the building and parking lots. R. p. 499-500. The County detennined that the property 
description was not a "platable legal description." R. p. 500. Dorothy McCarty was upset because 
she felt that she was entitled to more prope1iy than ,vas described by the metes and bounds 
description attached to the modified Quitclaim Deed in 2012. R. p. 499-500. 
C. THEDOCTRINESOFREFORt,1ATI0N,INTERLINEATION,ANDCORRECTION 
DEED CANNOT BE APPLIED TO CIRCUMVENT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
McCarty does not fully analyze these doctrines in her brief. She merely includes a citation 
to her smrunary judgment memorandum that was presented to the district comi. The distiict comi 
found that these doctrines could not be applied to substitute a valid property description in a deed 
for an invalid description. R. p. 603-06. These doctrines are intended to correct inadvertent 
sc1ivener's errors or a mutual mistake of the parties from invalidating a deed. Bilbao v. Krettinger, 
91 Idaho 69,415 P.2d 712 (1966); see Sartain v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 116 Idaho 269,272,775 P.2d 
161, 164 (Ct. App. 1989). The Statute of Frauds focuses not on "whether the parties had reached an 
agreement." Rather it focuses on "whether that agreement is adequately reflected in their written 
agreement." Lexington, 140 Idaho at 279, 92 P.3d at 529. In Lexington, the Court relied on its prior 
decision inAllen v. Kitchen where it disallowed parol evidence to supplement a property description 
and stated: 
The distinction, however, should always be clearly drawn between the admission of 
oral and extrinsic evidence for the purpose of identifying the land described and 
applying the description to the property and that of supplying and adding to a 
description insufficient and void on its face. 
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Id. at 283, 92 P.3d at 533 (quoting Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 143-44, 100 P. 1052, 1054 
909) ). McCarty cannot supply or add to the description in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed because that 
description was "insufficient and void on its face." :\1cCarty cannot reform the property description 
because it was void and not merely the subject of an inadvertent error or mutual mistake. 
A J1 T 1 1 1 1" ,1 • , ,1 1" , ' , , 1' 1 TT 11 , As mere was no mano case rnw mrecny on pmm, me msi:nci: coun renea on 11awerr v. 
Forney, 88 Wash. App. 669,945 P.2d 1137 (1997). The Washington Cami of Appealsdirectlystated 
that "an inadequate legal description is not subject to refonnation."Id. at 673, 945 P.2d at 1139-40. 
The Court in Halbert also held: 
This rule is well-founded, for if instruments such as this were routinely refonned, 
parties would have no incentive to include a proper legal description in any 
instruments purporting to convey real prope1iy. Enforcement of such agreements 
would effectively nullify the statute of frauds and involve the comis in precisely the 
"recourse to oral testimony" the statute seeks to avoid. 
Id. at 675, 945 P.2d at 1140-41. Allowing McCarty to use the doctrine of refonnation (or 
interlineation, or c01Tection deed) to alter the property description in the 2010 Quitclaim Deed would 
similar nullify Idaho's statute of frauds. 
Interlineation is a pennissible means of amending a written agreement. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that a handwritten interlineation that was initialed by the party against whom it was 
being enforced was a valid amendment to a lease. Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft &Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 
259, 265, 297 P.3d 222, 228 (2012). In the present matter, the handwritten interlineations on the 
2010 Quitclaim Deed were made by Laurie Cromwell, not David Benton. Cromwell did not have 
written authorization to make the changes by the Trust. Erb v. Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328, 332, 824 
P.2d 903, 907 (Ct. App. 1992) (the name of the grantee cannot be inserted by an agent for the grantor 
(beneficial owner here) unless the agent's authority is in writing and if the authority of the agent is 
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not writing, his insertion of the grantee's name in the deed does not pass title). The interlineations 
were made when Marvel Benton was not present and neither David or Marvel initialed the 
handwritten interlineations. R. p. 34-38, 408-09. It was David's practice to initial such 
interlineations as he did on the Warranty Deed marked as Instrument Number 1116070. R. p. 25. The 
interlineations are not valid and David and Marvel could not authorize the interlineations without 
the signature of a co-trustee. 
The doctrine of correction deed does not apply because at the time the attempted corrections 
to the 2010 Quitclaim Deed, David and Marvel were no longer auth01ized to engage in any 
transactions involving trust property without the signature of a Family Co-Trustee. David and Marvel 
did not have auth01ity under the Second Amendment to the Trust to authorize any transaction related 
to trust property with only their two signatures. A correction deed does not bestow new title on the 
grantee; rather, it is the confinnation of a title already possessed." Sartain v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 
116 Idaho 269, 272, 77 5 P .2d 161, 164 (Ct. App. 1989). Title was never passed because the property 
description in the original 2010 Quitclaim Deed was void on its face and could not be enforced. A 
correction deed could not bestow title that was never conveyed. 
The district court was correct when it rejected doctrines of refonnation, interlineation and 
correction deed in this case. The doctrines do not apply and cannot be used to circumvent the statute 
of frauds. 
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VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion and that is no part of the property which 
is at issue in this lawsuit was ever conveyed out of the Trust to Dorothy McCarty. The Quitclaim 
Deeds which were twice recorded are clouds on the title of this property. The district comi was 
co1Tect when it ordered that the Quitclaim Deeds dated July 1,2010, recorded on April 24, 2012, as 
Instrument No. 1415154 and then modified and re-recorded on May 4, 2012, as Instrument No. 
1416139 were not effective to transfer the subject property, or any party of it, out of trust; are of no 
legal effect; and convey no right, title or interest in or to Dorothy B. McCarty. The district court 
co1Tectly decided theses issues as a matter oflaw and that decision should be upheld on appeal. 
~ 
DATED this O ,, day of March, 2016. 
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